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One vendor script hit 178 sites. A checklist if your business site loads third-party code

In Report URI's test, only 24 sites with a content policy blocked the Optimizely payload. Here is why a single vendor can reach this many sites, and six steps for owners.

Bar chart of Report URI test results: 68 sites with no CSP, 50 where the policy let the payload and data theft through, 17 where data theft was blocked, 24 where the payload was blocked
Report URI crawl of sites' Content Security Policies. Chronicle graphic.

Almost every business website loads code it does not control: analytics, chat widgets, ad pixels, A/B testing. On Nov. 16, attackers got into customer projects at one such vendor, Optimizely, and 178 organizations served malicious code to their visitors, according to Report URI. The news is in our report; this is for owners of smaller sites.

Why one vendor can hit 178 sites

When your page loads a vendor's script, your visitors' browsers run it with the same powers as your own code: it can read what is typed into forms, see cookies and change what the page shows. The vendor serves the same kind of file to every customer. If an attacker can edit that file, or the settings behind it, every customer's visitors get the change at once, without anything on your server being touched. Report URI says the altered code still came from Optimizely's own servers, which is why many security tools saw nothing odd.

Checklist

  1. Inventory every script. Open your site, view the page source and the browser's Network tab, and list every outside domain that supplies code. Most owners find scripts nobody remembers adding. Remove anything unused; Scott Helme's follow-up post puts removing dead dependencies first.
  2. Ask each vendor three questions: do you enforce multi-factor authentication for accounts that can edit scripts, who at my company has such an account, and how will you tell me if something changes? Then remove former staff and agencies from those accounts and turn on MFA for yours.
  3. Add a Content Security Policy (CSP). It tells the browser which domains may load code and where data may be sent. Start in report-only mode, which logs violations without breaking anything; Helme argues that is better than nothing. Then enforce it. Avoid unsafe-eval, which Report URI found let the attacker's fallback code run even where its main file was blocked, and restrict the connect-src setting, which limits where data can be sent. In Report URI's crawl, that setting stopped data theft on 17 sites where the payload still ran.
  4. Use Subresource Integrity (SRI) where you can. Adding an integrity hash to a script tag makes the browser refuse the file if it changes. It works for fixed files you host or that never change. It does not work for scripts a vendor edits for you, as Helme notes, and Optimizely's are that kind.
  5. Prefer payment frames. Hosted card fields from a payment provider sit in a separate frame that, per Report URI, the skimmer could not read. Never collect card numbers in your own page forms if you can avoid it.
  6. Monitor for change. Turn on CSP reporting, or use a monitoring service, so you hear when a new script or new data destination appears. Check it weekly; a log nobody reads protects nothing.

How much protection do these steps give?

Report URI's test, charted above: of 159 sites in its results table, 68 had no CSP, 50 had one that let the payload and the data theft through, 17 had one that let the code run but blocked data leaving, and 24 (15%) blocked the payload. Its post says 256 hosts were crawled, a different figure from the table, so treat the split as indicative. Allowing the vendor's own domain did not help, since the attack came from that domain; protection came from a strict policy on which scripts could run.

If you do not run a developer, send this list to whoever manages your website and ask for a dated answer on each point. For the version for customers, see what to check if you visited an affected site.

Sources: Report URI; Scott Helme. Report URI sells monitoring products; the Chronicle does not endorse any vendor. Information, not security advice.

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